In September 2000 the member states of the United Nations embraced the Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Declaration was a United Nations resolution, representing a shared commitment among the member states to address global poverty. The Millennium Declaration was held to be distinguished by its provision of a human development plan that was based on setting quantified targets and an associated period for their attainment. Eight human development targets were designated. These were formulated as a response to what were understood to be the key dimensions comprising global poverty. These aims came to be known as the Millennium Development Goals. They are: (i) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger (ii) Achieve universal primary education (iii) Promote gender equality and empower women (iv) Reduce child morality (v) Improve maternal health (vi) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases (vii) Ensure environmental sustainability, and (viii) Develop a global partnership for development (UN Millennium Project 2005) .
The date set for the targets to be attained was 2015.
A critical ingredient in official equations of what it will take to achieve the Millennium Development Goals is an increase in the level of development aid contributed by wealthy countries. It has been projected that if the goals are to be attained, rich countries will need to boost the proportion of gross national income allocated to development aid up to an across-the-board figure of 0.7 per cent (HM Treasury 2004; Sachs 2005b) . While wealthy countries have agreed to this target (Sachs and McArthur 2005) , the promised increases have proven slow to materialise (Sachs 2005a) . Since the announcement of the Millennium Development Goals, there has been evidence of a gradual increase in contributions across developed countries (OECD 2006 ). Yet, with the exception of the Nordic countries (Gates and Hoeffler 2004) , the rich nations as a group remain well below the designated figure. However, what is perhaps most remarkable about this non-compliance is that the quantitative increase at stake has been overwhelmingly viewed as small and light in the extremeas easily within scope for wealthy countries. One well known commentator has recently gone so far as to suggest, 'Measured against our capacity, the Millennium Development Goals are indecently, shockingly modest' (Singer 2006) .
Beyond not meeting a moderate pledge they undertook to help redress world poverty, it is also the manner in which the wealthy nations have chosen not to do this that is noteworthy. The United Nations and supporters of the Goals have publicly levelled defaulting accusations against the rich countries (Sachs 2005b; Shetty 2005) .
In response to these indictments, the wealthy countries have been unresponsive both materially and culturally. In the face of the incriminating claims, they have neither upped their financial contributions nor sought to provide publicly visible justifications or excuses for as much (Orbuch 1997) . The latter course of action is significant, because it effectively represents a form of symbolic rebuff. So what is going on here?
How might we make sense of the non-compliance, and failure to account for as much, among wealthy signatory countries to the Millennium Development Goals?
Context, data and analytic strategy
It is my concern here to look at an important factor that might help us go some way towards explaining the lackadaisical response of rich countries to the Millennium Development Goals: the state of public attitudes around global poverty. A key line of inquiry I wish to explore here is the condition of ambivalence among the citizens and residents of wealthy countries to social problems beyond national borders. It is my contention that the active indifference of the rich nation-state towards global problems occurs under conditions where there exists a complementary blasé attitudinal structure amongst its peoples.
To assess the empirical evidence around this claim, I will scrutinise results from a module of questions on attitudes to the Millennium Development Goals (in particular) and foreign aid (more generally) that were developed for inclusion in the latest round of the World Values Survey (2005/6). In Australia, the entire survey questionnaire (which included this discrete subset of questions) was completed by a representative national sample of 1421 respondents. The strategy for analysing the available data concentrates on the specific matter of public support for Australian involvement in achieving the Millennium Development Goals? The analysis is designed to describe emergent patterns of endorsement, and to then consider the role of more established attitudes to global poverty in giving rise to them.
The analysis takes a particular interest in examining the comparative influence of two dimensions of attitudes to global poverty: public issue and personal problem (Wright Mills 1959) . Apprehended as a public issue, foreign aid is viewed at a distance, as the business of states, markets and organizations (Rosenau 1999 ). Yet, conceived as a personal problem, foreign aid comes to be experienced close-up, as a direct and tangible matter for the concerned individual. Using this two dimensional conception, the analysis explores how general attitudes to global poverty work to shape more specific opinions about how far the country should go in helping the United Nations to meet the Millennium Development Goals.
The Millennium Development Goals: what should Australia do?
Since the inauguration of the Millennium Development Goals, Australia has been one of the countries seen by the United Nations as having failed to contribute its fare share to foreign development aid. Furthermore, by not accounting for or explain this course of action, Australia has effectively represented itself as 'not answerable' to the United Nations. How do these national actions align with the views of Australian peoples?
Turning to Table 1 , the first question provides data on popular perceptions of the appropriate proportion of national income that should be contributed to foreign aid.
Around half of respondents felt that the government allocation for development aid was about right (48 per cent) (see Table 1 ). Among the remaining respondents there was a majority view that more needed to be done (43 per cent). Only a small minority of respondents felt that the amount the government contributed to foreign aid was too high (9 per cent). In sum, the weight of opinion amongst respondents as a whole was that the national government could spend more on development aid.
How much more? Focussing in on the sub-sample of respondents who though Australia was not doing enough (N=602), there is quite marked diversity about precisely how much greater the national contribution should be. The modal view was that the country should boost its contribution three-fold. Around one in four (24 per cent) thought funding should be augmented by the highest amount pro-offered to respondents in the question -(at the very least) by a multiple of four. How much legitimacy did the respondents cede to the United Nations as the leading body for addressing global problems? Of five key global issues presented at the bottom of Table 1 , three were seen by a majority of respondents to be best handled by the United Nations. Peacekeeping (69 per cent), human rights (60 per cent), and (of particular relevance here) foreign aid. About one in two respondents felt that responsibility for overseas development aid should be vested in the United Nations (52 per cent), while around one in three opined that national governments should be the leading agency here (32 per cent). Of the issues presented, only one was viewed by respondents as optimally dealt with by national governments: protection of the environment (47 per cent). With respect to the matter of refugees, respondents were fairly evenly divided between the United Nations (46 per cent) and national government (40 per cent) as the locus of primary responsibility.
Global poverty as a public issue
Apart from the more concrete questions of how far Australia should go in terms of providing increased financial support for overseas aid, and lending greater endorsement to the policies of the United Nations in this area, there is the more general background matter of how much importance do Australians feel the national government should attribute to addressing global social problems at all. We look at this question from two angles. How much significance do respondents feel the country should accord to global social issues in absolute terms? Furthermore, what level of importance is it felt they should be assigned when considered relative to the familiar raft of established domestic social problems? Table 2 presents data on the degree of significance respondents believe their national leaders should attribute to reducing social deprivation in poor countries.
Respondents were asked to consider five areas of global social inequity (lived experience of poverty, inadequate education, child mortality, the spread of HIV & AIDS, and the living conditions of slum dwellers), and to indicate how high a priority they felt national leaders should accord to redressing each. In sum, what the results show is that the large majority of respondents believed their country should assign a Furthermore, the data shows that the tendency to prioritise one or the other two kinds of social issue sets took on a harder form among respondents who viewed national problems as the main concern. Among these respondents, one in three saw global problems as irrelevant (24.7 per cent/74.8 per cent = 0.33 per cent). Yet, in the case of respondents who attributed precedence to global problems, the smaller proportion of one in five perceived national problems as a peripheral matter (4.7 per cent/25.5 per cent = 0.19 per cent).
Global poverty as a personal problem
The findings suggest that respondents on a whole view global social problems as deserving of attention by national government, unless that consideration is to come at a cost to national social issues. Under these conditions, the level of felt commitment to redressing global issues falls away markedly, displaced by the view that the national government should attribute greater importance to domestic social problems. The results suggest broadly similar levels of support, with a large minority of respondents appearing to experience global poverty and inequality as a personally-felt problem. To this end, the data in Table 4 show around one in three represents (33 per cent) indicated a preparedness to pay more tax if this meant an increase in Australia's foreign aid to poor countries. On the more specific question of personal knowledge of the Millennium Development Goals, the findings clearly show how remarkably few Australians have heard of them. Rather than being broadly recognised and familiar, the results revealed that some five years after they were pronounced to the world, only around one in eight participants (13 per cent) reported any awareness of their existence.
What of the relationship between willingness to pay higher taxes to the end of boosting Australia's contribution to foreign aid, and specific knowledge of the Millennium Development Goals? Does recognition and awareness of the Millennium Development Goals work to boost the preparedness of individual people to personally want to do more to encourage their country to address global poverty? The data suggest yes (see Table 5 ). While it is not an overly strong association, the evidence shows that participants who had a familiarity with the Millennium Development Goals were eight per cent more likely than participants who had not heard of them to report a willingness to bear the personal cost of higher taxation if it meant their country would enhance its commitment to helping alleviate global indigence. 
Public support for national involvement in achieving the Millennium Development Goals: the influence of established attitudes to global poverty
A key result from the analysis reported thus far is that respondents varied markedly with respect to how far they felt Australia should go in helping alleviate global poverty and inequality. On the question of financial aid, respondents were fairly evenly split between whether they thought Australia was currently doing enough or could do more. With respect to the question of the authority of the United Nations to deal with global social problems, majority endorsement was apparent on most of the issues canvassed -yet national and regional governments were also lent solid levels of support by subgroups of respondents. Against this backdrop, I now bring together the different aspects of the descriptive analysis to the end of considering if and how far do established attitudes towards global poverty account for this particular patterning of mass sentiment.
A series of regression analyses were undertaken to the end of specifying the aspects of background attitudes to global poverty that matter in shaping mass support for Australia contributing to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The findings are reported in Table 6 . Results are displayed from three regression analyses, (2) who should be responsible for policy formation and responsiveness on questions of global poverty and inequality. A common set of independent variables were included in each equation. These are based on the variables introduced in the preceding section of the article to measure the 'public issue' and 'personal problem' dimensions of establishing attitudes to global social problems. Measurement details for all dependent and independent variables included in the multivariate analysis are reported in Appendix Table A.   1 The findings show perceptions of whether Australia should do more, or less, to contribute to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals is shaped by both 'public issue' and 'personal problem' dimensions of established attitudes to global poverty. Feeling Australia's current contribution to foreign aid is too low and favouring boosting the amount is strongly associated with a more general proneness to view global poverty as a more important issue for Australia (as against national problems) (beta = 0.23 & 0.25) and personal willingness to pay more income tax to boost national foreign aid (rather than not) (beta = 0.36 & 0.18). Yet, these existing kinds of background attitudes were found to be of little relevance with respect to accounting for the proclivity to endorse the United Nations as the party responsible for policy formation on global poverty and inequality. While support for the role of the United Nations was found to be related to a background belief in the greater salience of global problems over domestic issues for Australia, this association was relatively weak (beta = 0.08).
Discussion
The analysis undertaken in this paper has shown that the citizens and residents of Australia in aggregate would like to see their country do more to help address problems of global poverty and inequality. To reiterate, they were disposed to view the national government as not contributing enough to the issue financially, and lent clear endorsement to the legitimacy of the United Nation, over and above the nationstate, to oversee the rectification of global problems. These views were forged against a complex background of established attitudes. As a public issue, they overwhelmingly viewed global problems as a top priority for Australia's leaders. Yet, when the scenario was presented to them, they ranked the country's domestic problems as a more pressing matter than global poverty. As a personal problem, a solid majority indicated they weren't open to paying more income tax to help out with the resolution of global problems. An even larger majority had not heard of the Millennium Development Goals. Yet, in the minority of cases where they were known, there was a greater readiness to endorse the increased income tax option.
In terms of the sources of public support for national involvement in redressing global problems, two elements within background attitudes to foreign aid were found to matter the most: seeing global poverty as a more pressing question for Australia than domestic problems, and preparedness to enhance one's personal monetary contribution to help the country address problems abroad. Yet, while these aspects of established attitudes were important in accounting for variation in public thinking about how far the government should go financially to help alleviate global poverty, they were much less consequential in terms of explaining whether or not the public endorsed the United Nations over the nation-state as the agent responsible for handling globally based problems. This finding is consistent with a more general lack of knowledge at the present time about the sources of public support for the United Nations in modern countries (Norris 2006) .
In sum the results here would seem to suggest that Australians accord national engagement with problems of global poverty a higher priority than their government.
In effect, there is some disjuncture between the concerns of citizens and government.
Yet, to date this pattern of civic interest has had little political effect. It has found minimal articulation in national political life. The current reality might simply be that there is a deep fragility to this attitudinal formation. While global poverty is of some concern to citizens in an absolute sense, it may be the case that it starts to press less strongly upon our consciences when located against the more familiar array of national political issues. As the results suggested, national problems were felt to trump global poverty in terms of their salience for the nation.
Before it can find solid expression on the national political stage, it may be the case that public sentiment about global problems will need hardening. What will this take?
It might well require a fundamental reconfiguration of the ways in which we imagine who we are. It could be that an over-time displacement of national by global identification in the minds of citizens and residents might create the conditions within nation-states for non-domestic issues like global poverty to carry greater weight within the political life of the nation. In fact, the findings from the analyses undertaken here suggest as much, showing that according greater priority to global poverty over national problems results in the strengthening of the call for greater government action on foreign aid and granting legitimacy to the authority of the United Nations. Yet, notwithstanding the ongoing changes being wrought by globalisation (Holton 2005) , we continue to live in a time where people remain overwhelmingly disposed to think of themselves in national rather than global terms (Phillips 2002) . The prospects for the growth of global self-identification occurring would thus seem to clearly remain at an early stage. Furthermore, in an era where nation-states continue to remain the predominant form of political community, it is perhaps unlikely that any rapid transformation in self-attachment in this direction is on the cards. 1. The reader will also note that each regression analysis was based on a markedly different N. This is a result of two questions of analytic interest being administered to subgroups with the larger sample (Present quantity of national contribution is the dependent variable in equation two, whereas significance of global problems is an independent variable is all three analyses. As reported in Tables 1 and 2 , the number of cases corresponding to each of these questions is 602 and 718 respectively). How this decision of research design reconfigures the number of cases available when different variables are correlated is reported in Appendix 
